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EXPECT THE UNEXPECTED:
THE NEED FOR CONTROL TO IMPOSE
VICARIOus LIABILITY IN STRATEGIC
ALLIANCES
The recent proliferation of strategic alliances' has increased
the importance of determining the legal relationship of member
firms. One area that must be addressed is the vicarious liability of
a firm when another member of the alliance is held liable in tort or
contract. Holding firms in a strategic alliance vicariously liable
for the acts of an ally may not be a cost the firm bargained for or
was able to foresee. Thus, measures to allocate risk and minimize
costs may not have been taken. When firms do not allocate risk
properly beforehand, it is unfair to hold them vicariously liable
unless they had the right to control the actions that gave rise to the
liability. The variance with which vicarious liability is imposed in
different types of strategic alliances and in different jurisdictions
makes it difficult to predict when vicarious liability will be im-
posed. A test that can be applied consistently is therefore neces-
sary so that firms can minimize liability efficiently, and not incur
transaction costs in ascertaining potential liability on a jurisdic-
tion-by-jurisdiction basis. This Comment argues that the appropri-
ate test is whether a firm has the right to control the specific con-
duct or performance of the ally which gave rise to the liability.
In exploring the adequacy and need for this test, Part I of this
Comment focuses on the legal relationship of firms in a strategic
alliance, and how vicarious liability fits within that framework.
Part II examines the extent to which a firm should be vicariously
liable for the torts and unauthorized contracts of an ally and argues
I George W. Dent, Jr., Gap Fillers and Fiduciary Duties in Strategic Alliances, 57 Bus.
LAW. 55, 55 (2001) (noting that the importance and proliferation of strategic alliances are a
result of economic and technological changes); see also Stephen Fraidin & Radu Lelutiu, Stra-
tegic Alliances and Corporate Control, 53 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 865, 865 n.3 (2003) (citing
Jeff Coburn, All for One: Strategic Alliances Between Firms Are Good for Clients, Business,
LEGAL MGMT., Sept.-Oct. 1998, at 46-47 ("[1f the 1980s was the 'Decade of the
Merger/Acquisition' then the 1990s is becoming the 'Decade of the Strategic Alliance."')).
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that only where the firm has the right to control the conduct in
question should vicarious liability be imposed. Finally, Part III
illustrates the role that control plays in determining the vicarious
liability of firms in strategic alliances by focusing on joint ven-
tures and franchises, and demonstrates that the inconsistent tests
among jurisdictions make gauging potential liability difficult and
hinder efforts to minimize liability.
I. THE STRATEGIC ALLIANCE FRAMEWORK
To understand the role of vicarious liability in strategic alli-
ances, it is first necessary to understand the legal relationship of
firms in strategic alliances. It is then prudent to examine how vi-
carious liability fits within the structure of strategic alliances.
A. What Is the Legal Relationship of Firms in a Strategic Alliance?
Strategic alliances include legal relationships such as joint
ventures, franchises, dealerships, distributorships, licensing ar-
rangements, and strategic investments.2 Often, a strategic alliance
pertains to a project and not an overall business undertaking. 3
There are, however, many different motivations to enter into a
strategic alliance, which vary by industry, by company, and by al-
liance.4 Regardless of the motivations for entering into a strategic
alliance, the legal relationship depends on form.
Firms must make many important decisions in choosing the
form of the alliance. One important issue in structuring an alliance
is whether to create a separate entity.5 For instance, one type of
strategic alliance, the joint venture, is normally treated as a general
partnership.6 Frequently, however, a corporation is created for the
joint venture to operate under,7 in which case the parties to the al-
2 Dent, supra note I, at 55; see also Fraidin & Lelutiu, supra note 1, at 868 (stating that
strategic alliances in the 1990s can be categorized into seven categories: "technology distribu-
tion ventures; cross-licensing arrangements and joint product development ventures; industry
coordination ventures; research consortia; start-up ventures; access to foreign markets arrange-
ments; and, 'no paradigm' ventures").
3 Phillip I. Blumberg, Control and the Partly Owned Corporation: A Preliminary Inquiry
into Shared Control, 10 FLA. J. INT'L L. 419, 462 (1996). It should be noted that Blumberg
does, however, distinguish strategic alliances from joint ventures.
4 Ruthanne Kurtyka, Strategic Alliances: What, Why and How?, in STRUCTURING, NE-
GOTIATING & IMPLEMENTING STRATEGIC ALLIANCES 41, 43 (PLI/Corp. 2000) (setting forth the
motivations to enter strategic alliances).
5 George Dent, Lawyers and Trust in Business Alliances, 58 Bus. LAW. 45, 67 (2002)
(noting that the choice of entity depends upon legal issues such as taxes and limited liability, as
well as transaction-cost economics).
6 Id. (noting also that the joint venture implies "a single, limited enterprise rather than a
broad collaboration of indefinite duration").
7 Id.
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liance are treated as shareholders of the corporation and not as
general partners. The legal relationship in other strategic alliances
is often unclear.8 It has been observed that "[i]n a franchise, deal-
ership, distributorship, or licensing agreement, each party pursues
profit, but these arrangements are usually not partnerships because
profits are earned separately, not shared from a single pool."9
Where the line is unclear, the relationship of the parties ought to
be governed by contract and the default rules appropriate to the
specific type of contract.' 0 However, even that approach to deter-
mining the legal relationship may be difficult to apply because the
default rules associated with the specific type of contract can vary
from jurisdiction to jurisdiction.
The level of fiduciary duties of firms in strategic alliances is
influenced by the choice of entity." The fiduciary duties owed in
a partnership are high, while the fiduciary duties owed in other
forms, such as corporations, are more uncertain.' 2 When a sepa-
rate corporation is the entity under which the strategic alliance op-
erates, the allies owe each other and the common alliance fiduciary
duties of care and loyalty. 3 The duty of loyalty in such a relation-
ship is more problematic because "investors in many alliances are
actual or potential competitors of the enterprise in which they in-
vest and . . . such investors often participate in different alliances
that may be competitive with each other."' 4 Fiduciary duties are
important in an alliance because they may determine "whether one
party to an alliance must share a business opportunity with the
other or can dissolve the alliance and force a sale of its assets."' 5
A breach of a fiduciary duty by one firm can give rise to a claim
against it by its ally. Firms in strategic alliances may modify fidu-
ciary duties to some extent, but this often imposes additional costs
in forming the alliance. 16
8 Id.
9 Id. (noting that under UNIF. P'SHIP ACT § 7 (1914), the receipt of a share of the profits
of a business is prima facie evidence that the person is a partner in the business).
"' See Larry E. Ribstein, Limited Liability Unlimited, 24 DEL. J. CORP. L. 407, 410 (1999)
(arguing that a business firm does not have to fit within one of the accepted business association
categories in order to limit the owners' liability for the firm's debts).
I Dent, supra note 5, at 68.
12 Id. (stating that fiduciary duties in non-public corporations are uncertain).
'3 Fraidin & Lelutiu, supra note I, at 874.
'4 Id. at 875.
15 Dent, supra note 5, at 68.
16 I
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B. Vicarious Liability in the Strategic Alliance Framework
Vicarious liability may be imposed on a firm for the conduct
of its ally. Vicarious liability is "the imposition of liability upon
one party for a wrong committed by another party."' 17 Imposition
of vicarious liability depends in part upon the nature of the activity
in which the wrong arises. 18  Business principals are often held
vicariously liable for the wrongs of their agents even if they do not
order, authorize, or encourage the agent to commit the wrong.19
Vicarious liability generally extends to torts and unauthorized con-
tracts by the principal's agent.2 ° It is in these circumstances that
firms in strategic alliances may come to be liable for their allies'
debts.
It is without question that owners of firms are vicariously li-
21able for the firm's debts. One deviation from this principle,
however, is that the shareholders of a corporation are its owners
but are not vicariously liable for its debts. An owner is one who
both controls and receives profits from the use of that control.22
"A sole controller and residual claimant is a principal in an agency
relationship, while one who shares ownership rights is a partner. ,23
If the relationship of the firms in the alliance results in co-
ownership, then the firms may be vicariously liable for one an-
other's debts.2 4 In theory, imposing vicarious liability on owners
protects victims while subjecting owners to minimal costs. 25 The
problem arises when a firm in a strategic alliance, such as a part-
ner, is not the "owner" and does not exercise control sufficient to
raise it to the level of an "owner," but yet still incurs liability be-
cause it has some minimal level of control. In that situation, the
firm is vicariously liable without the ability to mitigate the liability
17 Alan 0. Sykes, The Boundaries of Vicarious Liability: An Economic Analysis of the
Scope of Employment Rule and Related Legal Doctrines, 101 HARV. L. REV. 563,563 (1988).
18 Id.
19 Alan 0. Sykes, The Economics of Vicarious Liability, 93 YALE L.J. 1231, 1231 (1984);
see also John L. Hanks, Franchisor Liability for the Torts of Its Franchisees: The Case for
Substituting Liability as a Guarantor for the Current Vicarious Liability, 24 OKLA. CITY U. L.
REV. I, 15-16 (1999) (stating that generally a plaintiff must show a causal linkage between the
defendant's act and the plaintiffs injury, but that vicarious liability deviates from this general
principle).
20 Sykes, supra note 19, at 1231.
21 Ribstein, supra note 10, at 411 (additionally noting that economic and legal definitions
of a firm are imprecise).
22 Id.
23 Id.
24 Id. at 414 (noting that firms may also have management, profit-sharing, and fiduciary
obligations under agency and partnership default rules).
25 Id. at 411 (stating that the owners' control enables them to take loss-avoidance meas-
ures, while profit sharing gives them incentive to do so carefully).
[Vol. 54:2
EXPECT THE UNEXPECTED
because it does not have control in the alliance sufficient to allow
it to take risk-reducing measures.
An essential element in the principal-agent relationship, in
which vicarious liability is imposed on the principal, is some de-
gree of control by the principal over the conduct of the agent. 26 If
a strategic alliance is a partnership, in that the member firms are
partners and thus are both principals and agents of each other,27
determining who is in control becomes complicated. 28 "[T]he ef-
fects of vicarious liability on resource allocation often depend on
the ability of principals to observe the loss-avoidance behavior of
their agents., 29 Therefore, the risks of vicarious liability can be
minimized where the principal controls the behavior of an agent.
When control is difficult to discern, the ability to minimize the
effects of vicarious liability is difficult because a firm not expect-
ing to be liable for its ally's debts will not seek indemnification
and insurance until after the liability has arisen. Thus, it is ques-
tionable whether vicarious liability should be imposed on a firm in
a strategic alliance when the ability to control is difficult to detect.
When structuring the strategic alliance, liability should not be
the primary reason for choosing one form of venture over an-
other.3 ° If the alliance is structured properly, limited liability can
be achieved whether the alliance is a general partnership or a con-
tractual joint venture. 31 Also, firms have the ability to allocate li-
ability contractually ex ante, but doing so can lead to significant
transaction costs. Vicarious liability cannot be limited without this
proper structuring or contracting because it is imposed by common
law governing such enterprises. For example, the nature of a joint
venture is such that any negligence on the part of one party may be
imputed to the other, thereby allowing a third person to recover an
entire claim against any member of the joint venture.: This liabil-
ity is imposed when the joint venturer is acting within the scope of
the venture.33 The risk may be shifted by a promise to insure or
indemnify the other party. 34 An absence of these contractual limi-
26 Herbert B. Chermside, Jr., Annotation, Vicarious Liability of Private Franchisor, 81
A.L.R. 3D 764, 769 (1977) (citing 3 AM. JUR. 2D Agency § 2 (1936)).
27 Ribstein, supra note 10, at 412.
28 Id. (noting that control is more ambiguous in partnership than in agency).
29 Sykes, supra note 19, at 1245.
30 David Ernst & Stephen Glover, Tug of War: Combining Legal and Business Best Prac-
tice, in STRUCTURING, NEGOTIATING & IMPLEMENTING STRATEGIC ALLIANCES 37, 42
(PLI/Corp. 2001) (analyzing the lawyer's perspective in structuring an alliance).
31 Id.
32 46 AM. JUR. 2D Joint Ventures § 42 (1962).
33 Id.
4 Id.
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tations can lead to unexpected liabilities for a firm in a joint ven-
ture as well as for firms in other forms of strategic alliances.
There are, however, significant transaction costs to risk-
sharing agreements.35  Thus, while it may be in a firm's best inter-
est to allocate liability, it may be more profitable not do SO. 36 This
is primarily due to costly negotiations and drafting. Additionally,
not allocating liability allows for more flexibility in the venture,
which is essential for success.3 7 A firm must still be able to act to
minimize liability from the activities of the strategic alliance, and
therefore, there must be some way for a firm to determine the ex-
tent to which it will be vicariously liable for the conduct of its ally.
A firm can only act to minimize liability when it has an expecta-
tion that it can be vicariously liable for the acts of its ally. The
question then becomes: In what circumstances within a strategic
alliance will a firm expect liability based on the conduct of its
ally?
II. To WHAT EXTENT SHOULD A FIRM BE VICARIOUSLY
LIABLE IN A STRATEGIC ALLIANCE?
In determining the extent to which a firm should be vicari-
ously liable in a strategic alliance, the predominant determinant
ought to be the level of control that the firm has in the relationship.
"Control is the underlying element that assures the coordinated
integration of the activities of the group .... ,38 In a strategic alli-
ance, firms may share control to varying degrees, ranging from the
full power to command to lesser degrees of influence. 39  The
amount of control exerted is a fact that must be evaluated in light
35 Sykes, supra note 19, at 1245.
36 Id.
37 Fraidin & Lelutiu, supra note 1, at 873.
38 Blumberg, supra note 3, at 420.
39 Id. at 423. Blumberg illuminates the concept of shared control in the corporate context
as having at least six different levels of the power to control:
(1) [i]nvolvement in a group that by acting in concert has the power to elect a
majority of the board of directors of a corporation; (2) involvement in the manage-
ment of the subsidiary (or controlled) corporation, including actual participation in
the tort, statutory violation, or other corporate acts of the subsidiary giving rise to al-
leged liability; (3) involvement in the management of the subsidiary including par-
ticipation in day-to-day affairs but not in the subsidiary's acts giving rise to alleged
liability; (4) general involvement in the management of the subsidiary but not in-
cluding day-to-day affairs; (5) no involvement in the management of the subsidiary,
but having a veto over actions of the parent, including those affecting the subsidiary
and its operations; and (6) no involvement in the management of the subsidiary, but
having a position disposing the management of the parent to consult it and to take its
views into account in determining actions of the parent affecting the subsidiary and
its operations.
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of the law in the particular area4° - for example, joint venture and
franchise law. Different entities should not be treated identically,
especially since the choice of entity decision is given careful
thought and could be frustrated if courts disregard the distinc-
tions.4 1 However, where vicarious liability is concerned, a consis-
tent test is useful to firms for planning purposes.
When the parties have properly structured the alliance and al-
located liability contractually, the extent to which a firm is vicari-
ously liable should be clear. It is when the structuring of the alli-
ance and the contracting among the firms fail that the vicarious
liability of a firm in a strategic alliance should be determined by
the amount of control. Since contracts in strategic alliances are
often incomplete,42 a mechanism is needed for determining
whether a member firm should be vicariously liable. Indeed, it
may be better to have an alliance that is less structured and more
flexible with regards to control and ownership because those alli-
ances are statistically more likely to lead to a successful venture.43
Further, it has been said that "[w]here parties will need to cooper-
ate and to trust each other after signing, the tendency of hard, pro-
tracted bargaining over details to defeat this goal must be counted
among the costs." 44 Thus, where control and ownership are not
clearly defined, the courts should look to the extent of control in
ascertaining the vicarious liability of a firm for its ally.
It also has been said that "[c]ontrol plays a crucial role in the
application of enterprise principles wherever they have been
adopted in U.S. law."4 5 Control is a fact-specific concept that must
be evaluated within the dimensions of the applicable area of law. 46
40 Id. at 424.
41 Dent, supra note 1, at 87 (noting that the respect due to legislatures counsels against
disregarding statutory differences).
42 Id. at 85. Dent argues that courts mistakenly assume that strategic alliance contracts are
complete because they believe that (1) the allies are usually large firms and sophisticated, (2)
strategic alliances are important transactions that are expected to be carefully negotiated, and (3)
the contracts are large and complicated. Id. The presumption fails, Dent argues, because busi-
nesses may lack experience with strategic alliances, lawyers may know little about such alli-
ances because there is not a specialized bar for strategic alliances, and the parties to alliances are
often cash starved firms. Id.
43 Fraidin & Lelutiu, supra note 1, at 873 (stating that less structured and more flexible
ventures are often preferred).
44 Dent, supra note 5, at 78.
41 Blumberg, supra note 3, at 424.
46 Id. Blumberg argues:
[C]ontrol is a doctrine whose significance in the application of enterprise principles
attributing legal rights or imposing legal obligations ... depends on the global con-
text (the juridical area of law under consideration, that is statutory or common law),
the general context (the particular statute or branch of common law), and the par-
ticular context (the particular aspect in issue) in which it arises.
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In strategic alliances, control is often shared in the sense that more
than one firm has or exercises control. 47 The determination of the
amount of control necessary to establish liability must be made in
accordance with the general policies of the area of law in question
and the specific context in which it is being applied. 48 In the con-
text of strategic alliances, vicarious liability should only be im-
posed when the control is such that the firm can expect to be liable
and can therefore minimize the potential liability ex ante. Expec-
tation does not simply require that a clear test be promulgated;
rather, a test that is fair and efficient in imposing vicarious liability
is needed. Expectations can be met by viewing control narrowly
as opposed to broad control over the operations of the ally firm.
When ascertaining the extent to which a firm exercises con-
trol, courts should look to whether the firm has the right to control
the means of performance. 49  That is, courts should focus on
whether the firm had the power to control the specific activity
which led to the creation of the liability, whether it is a tort or an
unauthorized contract. If the test for vicarious liability in the stra-
tegic alliance was simply that a firm must exercise some control in
order to be held vicariously liable, then the firm would not only be
subject to claims that it did not bargain for or foresee, but also for
claims that it did not have the ability to minimize ex ante. Such a
test is both inefficient and unfair compared to the right to control
test.
To illustrate, suppose that a restaurant franchisee, Firm A, is
liable to a customer for serving adulterated food that caused her to
be injured. This adulterated food was prepared using a process
that Firm A developed. Suppose Firm B, the franchisor, does not
have the right to control the processes used by its franchisees, but
does have the right to control other aspects of Firm A. Firm B,
under this test, should not be vicariously liable because it did not
control the specific activity that caused the harm. If Firm B had
control over the food preparation process, it could have taken steps
to prevent such an injury and minimize its liability. To take this
hypothetical one step further, suppose Firm B had control over the
day-to-day operations of Firm A. However, day-to-day operations,
as defined in the contract, do not encompass food preparation.
Thus, Firm B did not expect to be liable for this activity and did
47 Id.
48 Id.
49 See Michael R. Flynn, The Law of Franchisor Vicarious Liabili . : A Critique, 1993
COLUM. Bus. L. REV. 89, 91 (1993) (stating that in an agency relationship, the principal has the
power to control the means of performance, while in an independent contractor relationship, the
principal can only control the result of the performance).
[Vol. 54:2
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not take steps to minimize its liability, and therefore, it is unfair to
hold Firm B vicariously liable. Further, if it were some other non-
essential business activity that caused the harm, then it may not be
foreseeable that it is included in the day-to-day operations of Firm
A. Thus, imposing vicarious liability, in the absence of the right to
control, is inappropriate.
The right to control test is efficient because it is possible that
transaction costs, both negotiation and enforcement costs, may
make allocating liability by contract more expensive and therefore,
inefficient. 50  Negotiation costs can be especially significant "if the
likelihood or magnitude of a given wrong is small in relation to the
value of the agency of the parties."'', This, of course, assumes that
the firms in an alliance are aware that they may be treated as being
in a partnership - a principal and an agent of each other - prior to
forming the alliance.52 Enforcement costs can be high when a
principal has a right of indemnity against the agent.5 3  Since con-
tracting to assign liability may be inefficient, allocating liability
using a mechanism, such as the right to control the conduct, is de-
sirable.
Vicarious liability for a given wrong is most likely inefficient
where an enterprise does not cause the wrong and cannot reduce
the probability of the wrong.54 Imposing vicarious liability in
these circumstances may lead to increased costs that can affect the
firm and ultimately consumers because firms may pass the costs on
to consumers in the form of increased prices. It is only where a
firm "can dissuade wrongdoing at little or no cost through the
adoption of incentives that affect the behavior of potential wrong-
doers, the imposition of vicarious liability can motivate the adop-
tion of such incentive devices. 55 This Comment posits that these
50 Sykes, supra note 19, at 1242-43.
I- d. at 1242.
52 Strategic alliances, and particularly joint ventures, are creatures of contract. Fraidin &
Lelutiu, supra note 1, at 872. Scholars writing on the subject have noted that by resorting to the
joint venture form, the parties are able to contemplate problems in advance and resolve them ex
ante by negotiation. Id. This does, however, overlook that an important advantage of the joint
venture form is the ability to be flexible and adapt to changing market conditions. Id. at 873.
-3 Sykes, supra note 19, at 1243.
' Sykes, supra note 17, at 575. Sykes discusses these two inefficiencies in terms of vi-
carious liability of an employer for the acts of its employees. Id. This Comment suggests that
these two inefficiencies are also present when vicarious liability is imposed on a firm in a stra-
tegic alliance. With regard to the first inefficiency, if the alliance does not cause the harm, then
the conduct is not within the scope of the alliance and an ally firm should not be liable for such
acts. As to the second inefficiency, if a firm cannot reduce the probability of the wrong, then to
impose liability upon it vicariously would be to impose costs that they have no ability to reduce
ex ante.
5 Id. at 578-79 (discussing the application of vicarious liability outside the employment
relationship).
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circumstances exist only where a firm can expect to be vicariously
liable, which will be the case where the firm has a right to control
the specific conduct that gave rise to liability.
The right to control test is also fair because if a firm has the
right to control the acts of its ally, then it is in the best position to
prevent the liability from arising, assuming that the conduct is
within the scope of the alliance. Moreover, the right to control test
does not allow a firm to avoid liability when it can control the spe-
cific conduct that leads to liability. For instance, an agreement
may state that Firm A is independently contracting Firm B. 56 Firm
A, however, retains the right to control a particularly hazardous
part of the undertaking.57 As a result of the independent contractor
relationship, Firm A can avoid liability when Firm B causes dam-
ages to someone or something while carrying out its duties during
the hazardous part of the task.58 In this situation, it would be fair
to hold Firm A liable because it had the right to control how Firm
B performed its duties.59
Therefore, a firm should be vicariously liable for the conduct
of its ally in a strategic alliance if it has the right to control the
specific actions of the ally, and the ally is acting within the scope
of the alliance. Only then is it fair and efficient to impose such
liability on a firm. When a firm has the right to control the spe-
cific conduct of its ally, it can expect to be liable and will take
steps to minimize liability in advance. This reasoning comports
with a firm's expectations when it enters into an alliance and does
not contractually allocate liability.
III. CONTROL AT WORK IN STRATEGIC ALLIANCES
This section, by focusing specifically on joint ventures and
franchises, both of which are prone to claims involving vicarious
liability, examines the different ways control is used by the courts
to determine the vicarious liability of firms in strategic alliances.
The purpose of this section is to illustrate the inconsistency of the
courts in using control as a determinant of vicarious liability in
strategic alliances.
56 Jackson v. Standard Oil Co., 505 P.2d 139, 144 (Wash. Ct. App. 1972) (using this
hypothetical).
57 Id.
58 Id.
59 Id.
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A. Joint Ventures
A joint venture is "a collective undertaking by two or more
parties to conduct a business operation separate from their own
operations.",60 Joint ventures may be formed for a variety of pur-
61poses. Unless the joint venture is in the corporate form, such an
undertaking is treated as a partnership organized for a limited time
and purpose and is governed by analogy to partnership principles.
62
Partnerships and other organizational forms lock the venturers into
strong partnership-type co-management default rules and strong
fiduciary duties.63 Courts generally treat a joint venture organized
as a separate corporation under corporate law, and not under prin-
ciples for non-incorporated joint ventures. 64 Thus, when the alli-
ance is structured in the corporate form, the uncertain partnership
principles will not apply.
Courts apply different tests when determining whether a joint
venture exists such as to give rise to vicarious liability. Courts
have considered varying degrees of control in these tests, sonle
requiring equal control. In Estate of Hernandez v. Flavio,65 the
Arizona Supreme Court stated that among the elements of a busi-
ness joint venture is an equal right of control. 66  The court tem-
pered this requirement by stating that each joint venturer must
share "to some extent" in the control of the joint venture.67  A
Washington court, in Adams v. Johnston,68 stated that a joint ven-
ture does not arise unless, among other things,69 the firms have an
60 Blumberg, supra note 3, at 462-63.
61 ALAN S. GUTrERMAN, CORPORATE COUNSEL'S GUIDE TO STRATEGIC ALLIANCES
11.001 (1997) (stating that joint ventures may be formed "to conduct research and development
work on new products or technical applications, to manufacture or produce various products, to
market and distribute products and services in a specified geographic area, or to perform some
combination of the aforementioned functions").
62 Blumberg, supra note 3, at 463.
63 Ribstein, supra note 10, at 417.
64 Blumberg, supra note 3, at 463.
65 930 P.2d 1309 (Ariz. 1997). The court addressed the issue of whether pledges of a fra-
ternity were members of a joint venture to provide alcohol to minors. Id. at 1312. Though the
court acknowledged that joint ventures are generally commercial in nature, it stated that joint
venture theory is not limited to business joint ventures. Id. The court held that the evidence
was insufficient to give rise to a joint venture. Id. at 1313.
66 Id. at 1312 (citing Tanner Cos. v. Superior Court, 696 P.2d 693, 695 (Ariz. 1984))
(claiming that the other elements of a joint venture are an agreement, a common purpose, a
community of interest, and participation in profits and losses).
67 Id. at 1313 (stating further that "it is sufficient that a venturer has some voice or right to
be heard in the control and management of the venture").
68 860 P.2d 423 (Wash. Ct. App 1993). The court dealt with the issue of whether a medi-
cal center was vicariously liable for the acts of a doctor, who was an employee of a unit within
the center. Id. at 430. The court ultimately found that no joint venture relationship existed, and
thus, the medical center was not vicariously liable. Id. at 430.
69 The other elements, according to the court, are a common purpose and intention to act
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equal right to a voice accompanied by an equal right of control.7°
Similarly, a Missouri court, in Ritter v. BJC Barnes Jewish Chris-
tian Health Systems,7' stated that "[in order to form a joint venture
the parties must have equal control over the enterprise."72 This
requirement of equal control is troublesome for two reasons. First,
it seems inflexible because equal control is a specific amount of
control, not appearing subject to variation. Second, there seems to
be no way to quantify the control. It could be broad control over
the enterprise or control over the specific activity. Although two
firms may have equal control over the enterprise, they may not
have equal control over the activity that caused the injury.
Courts in other jurisdictions have been more flexible about the
control required for a joint venture to exist. For example, the
United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, in Wil-
liams v. Obstfeld,73 applying Florida law, found that a joint ven-
ture, like a partnership, requires joint control or right of control.74
Courts have applied similar control tests in other jurisdictions.75 A
court in Illinois focused the control test in Behr v. Club Med,
Inc.,76 stating that for purposes of vicarious liability, a joint ven-
ture requires, among other elements, 77 "a right to joint control and
management of the property used in the joint venture. 78 This test
is problematic because control over property in general does not
mean that a joint venturer had the right to control the conduct that
resulted in liability. Thus, a firm can be vicariously liable simply
as joint venturers, and a community of interest. Id. at 611.
70 Id.
71 987 S.w.2d 377 (Mo. Ct. App. 1999). The court determined that there was no joint
venture, and thus no vicarious liability between BJC and a hospital. Id. at 388.
72 Id.
73 314 F.3d 1270 (1 1th Cir. 2002). The court concluded that there was no joint venture,
and thus no vicarious liability, as there was no joint control or joint right to control the business.
Id. at 1276.
74 Id. at 1275-76 (stating that the other elements are a common purpose, a joint proprietary
interest in the subject matter, and the right to share profits and the duty to share losses).
75 See Stevenson v. Rochdale Inv. Mgmt., Inc., 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13110, at *27
(N.D. Tex. Sept. 7, 2000) (stating that under Texas law a joint venture requires, among other
things, "a mutual right of control or management of the enterprise"); Stallings v. Sylvania Ford-
Mercury, Inc., 533 S.E.2d 731, 734 (Ga. Ct. App. 2000) (stating that a joint venture is created
when two or more people contribute their property or labor in a joint undertaking for profit,
"with rights of mutual control," provided that the arrangement does not establish a partnership);
Farm-Fuel Prods. Corp. v. Grain Processing Corp., 429 N.W.2d 153, 156 (Iowa 1988) (stating
that a joint venture requires, among other elements, "a mutual right to control").
76 546 N.E.2d 751, 760 (I11. App. Ct. 1989) (dealing with the issue of whether a joint ven-
ture existed between a resort where the plaintiff allegedly sustained injuries and another com-
pany as a result of marketing the vacations). The court held that it did not have to address the
issue because the pleading was defective. Id. at 760-61.
77 The other elements include a community of interest in the purpose of the joint venture,
and a right to direct and govern the policy and conduct of the other joint venturer. Id. at 760.
79 Id.
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because it can control assets in the venture which may be wholly
unrelated to the conduct and miles away from the place where the
injury occurred.
Control, by itself, is typically not determinative as to whether
a joint venture exists; at least one jurisdiction does not even re-
quire joint control as an element of a joint venture.79 Control,
however, should be emphasized when it comes to imposing vicari-
ous liability on a joint venturer. The act of entering into a joint
venture should not automatically give rise to vicarious liability.
Such a result would be direct liability, in effect, and the conduct
that the firm would be liable for would be the act of entering into
the joint venture. Control over the activity that caused the harm
ensures that there is a connection between the conduct that gave
rise to the liability and the firm, so that the liability can be pre-
vented and possibly minimized.
B. Franchises
In franchises, the franchisor faces a difficult task. It must ex-
ercise sufficient control over the franchisee to protect the franchi-
sor's national identity, while at the same time avoiding a degree of
control that will render it vicariously liable for the acts of the fran-
chisee. 80 The test for vicarious liability of the franchisor has gen-
erally focused on the extent of control it can exercise over the
franchisee. 8' A franchise, however, is not an agency relationship
or a relationship between two independent contractors. 82 A fran-
chise sets out "a detailed scheme of control between two autono-
mous businesses. Courts have forced the franchisee into either
an agency relationship or an independent contractor relationship.
84
This is problematic because the nature of a franchised good or ser-
vice implies some, but not total control over the means of per-
formance.85 The test urged in Part II solves this problem because
it requires the franchisor to actually have the right to control the
conduct that gave rise to the liability.
The analysis courts use to determine whether a franchisor has
control sufficient to give rise to vicarious liability for the acts of
79 See Edwards v. Price, 550 P.2d 856, 859 (Colo. 1976) (stating that the criteria of a joint
venture are: "(1) joint interest in property among the alleged joint venturers, (2) express or im-
plied agreement to share in profits or losses of the venture, and (3) actions and conduct showing
cooperation in the project").
80 Chermside, supra note 26, at 769.
91 Id.
82 Flynn, supra note 49, at 90.
H3 Id.
84 Id. at 91.
85 Id.
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the franchisee varies greatly among jurisdictions.86 At least one
court's analysis of whether a franchisor had control over the fran-
chisee was internally inconsistent. In Viches v. MLT, Inc.,87 the
Michigan court stated that a franchisor's vicarious liability for the
torts of its franchisees depends on whether a principal-agent rela-
tionship exists, and in so determining, a court must assess whether
the principal had a right to control the agent's actions. 88 However,
the court then stated that the question is whether the franchisor
controls the day-to-day operations of the franchisee.89  This
reasoning is inconsistent because the determination as to whether a
principal-agent relationship exists initially focuses on control of
the agent's specific actions, while the inquiry is later focused on
control of the day-to-day operations. Control over day-to-day op-
erations may or may not entail control over the specific action in
question, and to presume that it does is inconsistent with the initial
focus. This inconsistency is representative of the conflicting views
of what constitutes control sufficient to give rise to vicarious li-
ability in the franchisor-franchisee relationship.
Some courts utilize a control test similar to the one that this
Comment advocates. These courts look to whether the franchisor
has control over the actions of the franchisee or its employees that
led to liability. A Texas court, in Cole v. Century 21 Real Estate
Corp.,9° best spells out what should be required in order to make a
franchisor vicariously liable. The court stated that to determine
whether a principal is vicariously liable for the conduct of an
agent, "the key question is whether the principal has the right to
control the agent with respect to the details of that conduct."91 The
court reasoned that "[i]f there is no right of control over the mat-
ters material to the pending lawsuit, there is no agency relationship
as to those matters. 92 Another case that took a narrow view of the
control that is required was the New York case Wu v. Dunkin'
86 See id. (noting that courts attach different weight to certain indicia of control, as evi-
denced by the fact that, in a few jurisdictions, certain elements of control, such as the right to
specify operations, are dispositive, while other courts are interested in the potential for control,
and others yet are concerned with actual control).
87 127 F. Supp. 2d 828 (E.D. Mich. 2000).
88 Id. at 832.
89 Id.
90 2000 Tex. App. LEXIS 8156 (Dec. 7, 2000). This case dealt with the issue of whether
Century 21 could be liable for claims against its franchisee for intentional interference with
prospective contracts, defamation, common-law fraud, and statutory violations. Id. at *2. The
court ultimately concluded that the franchisor was not vicariously liable. Id. at *8-9.
91 Id. at *6 (citing State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co. v. Traver, 980 S.W.2d 625, 627 (Tex.
1998)).
92 Id. The court also stated that in making the determination, it looks to the franchise
agreement to determine the right of control. Id. at *7.
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Donuts, Inc.,9 3 where the court held that a franchisor is vicariously
liable where it exercises considerable control over the franchisee
and the specific instrumentality at issue.94 The Wu court noted that
retaining a right to enforce standards or to terminate an agreement
for failure to meet specified standards is not sufficient control.95
Moreover, a right to reenter the premises and inspect did not give
rise to a legal duty.9 6 Though focusing on the control exercised
and not on the right of control, the court illustrates that a vague
right to enforce standards is not enough for a firm to be vicariously
liable. These cases demonstrate that a narrow view on whether a
franchisor has control over a franchisee, such that it may be vicari-
ously liable, comports with the idea that no agency relationship
exists where the franchisor does not have the specific right to con-
trol the conduct or performance of the franchisee.
At least one court has defined control more broadly, looking
at whether the franchisor controls the day-to-day operations of the
franchisee. The Michigan court in Ciofo v. Shock97 stated that "a
franchisor must have the right to control the day-to-day operations
of a franchise in order to establish an agency relationship. 98 The
court further found that such a relationship is not created where the
franchisor merely retains the right to set standards regarding prod-
ucts and services, or has the right to regulate advertising. 99 This
approach, followed by courts in other jurisdictions, 1° is trouble-
some because it does not focus on whether the franchisor could
control the specific conduct that led to liability. To hold a franchi-
sor liable when it did not have the right to control the conduct, but
did have a vague right to control the day-to-day operations, is sim-
93 105 F. Supp. 2d 83 (E.D.N.Y. 2000), affid, 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 2544 (2d Cir. Feb.
20, 2001). The issue presented was whether Dunkin' Donuts could be liable for a rape that
occurred on the franchisee's premises. Id. at 84. The court found that there was no evidence in
the record that Dunkin' Donuts exercised actual control over the security measures taken by its
franchisee, and thus was not vicariously liable. Id. at 85.
94 Id. at 88.
95 Id.
96 Id.
97 1997 Mich. App. LEXIS 1676 (May 16, 1997). The court dealt with the issue of
whether the franchisor was vicariously liable for injuries sustained by the plaintiff when the
franchisee's employee struck him from behind while delivering pizzas. Id. at *1. The court
found that there was no evidence that the franchisor had the requisite control. Id. at *5-6.
98 Id. at *4.
99 Id.
'00 Flynn claims:
[C]ourts consider control over day-to-day operations as a proxy for control of the
means of performance. Accordingly, in a franchise relationship, the issue of vicari-
ous liability turns on whether the franchisor's control over the day-to-day operations
of the franchisee is so extensive that the franchise relationship is really one of
agency.
Flynn, supra note 49, at 91.
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ply not what the franchisor bargained for when it entered into the
alliance. If a firm is to be liable when it has day-to-day control,
then vicarious liability is seemingly endless. Surely there are
some instances where a firm should not be liable, such as when an
employee is not acting within the scope of her employment.
Some countervailing considerations suggest that franchisors
should be vicariously liable for the conduct of the franchisee, es-
pecially with regard to tortious conduct. Imposing liability on
franchisors encourages them to monitor and discipline franchisees
so that they take appropriate action to avoid unnecessary risks.' 0 '
Imposing vicarious liability on the franchisor also provides an in-
centive to assure that the franchisee is covered by liability insur-
ance that, "at the margin, equates the expected benefit to the fran-
chisor of an additional unit of insurance with the cost to the fran-
chisee to purchase the marginal unit of insurance."'' 0 2  Despite
these justifications for imposing vicarious liability on the franchi-
sor, the imposition of vicarious liability in all cases is simply un-
fair to the franchisor that cannot anticipate being liable for certain
activities not within its control. Therefore, it must be where the
franchisor has control over the acts of the franchisee that liability
ensues.
CONCLUSION
There are many factors a firm must consider when deciding
whether to enter into a strategic alliance, but vicarious liability for
the acts of its ally may not be one of them. Therefore, liability
often comes as a surprise because there was no expectation of it
and there may not be a contractual provision to govern such a
situation. When there is no contractual allocation, the tests for
imposing vicarious liability vary among jurisdictions and from one
type of strategic alliance to the next. These tests differ over the
degree of control necessary to impose vicarious liability.
To be fair and consistent, the test for vicarious liability should
be whether the firm had the right to control the specific activity
that led to the liability. If a firm has the ability to control the spe-
cific conduct, it is in the best position to prevent the liability from
arising. Conversely, if a firm does not have the right to control,
then it will not expect the liability to be imposed upon it and there-
101 Hanks, supra note 19, at 18 (arguing that franchisors are in the best position to perform
these functions because they know the types of risks to which franchisees, their customers, and
third parties are exposed).
102 Id. at 24. Hanks further argues that at lower levels of insurance there is possibly a neg-
ligible cost to the franchisor because the franchisee may be willing to purchase insurance with-
out being urged to do so by the franchisor. Id.
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fore cannot minimize the losses. This right to control test is fairly
easy to determine; one just needs to look at the contract and the
surrounding circumstances of the strategic alliance. It can also be
applied consistently, thereby comporting with the parties' expecta-
tions when entering into a strategic alliance. Accordingly, the
right to control is the appropriate tool for determining whether a
firm in a strategic alliance is vicariously liable for the conduct of
its ally.
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